

THE HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE: BALANCING DEONTOLOGY WITH TELEOLOGY

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Abstract. *The human security discourse has mostly been concerned with a deontological approach to security. In this paper I consider a more basic foundation for human security, where the response to insecurities of the other is mediated by a critical hermeneutical ethics. In this way the paper aims to supplement the standard conception of human security, so as to take account of the phenomenological treatments of an ethics of action, and to give more prominence to the hermeneutical appropriation of the language of evil, of the unfamiliar other and the teleological quest for justice.*

Keywords: *human security, teleology, human development, ethics, deontology.*

1. Introduction

The debate around the concept of human security has dominated the international peace and security discourse for the past three decades or so. The first approach to human security can be traced back to the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This approach operates on the assumption that individuals must be free from both fear and want. If freedom from fear examines the security of the individual in the context of threats of violence (as generated by genocide, slavery or death), freedom from want recognises security as a means to empower the individual to overcome the insecurity resulting from underdevelopment (lack of health, social, economic, and political security). Given the underlying epistemology, I should call this the “optimistic” model of understanding human security. That is to say that the threats to human security are bound to manifest themselves within the diversity of human practice. There is no uneasiness when it comes to identifying and labelling threats to human security.

Another basic idea of the United Nations (UN) approach is that if you are truly committed to a broad understanding of human security you must respond to all vulnerabilities and insecurities an individual might experience. A notable contribution to the broadening of the concept of security from the responsibility to protect (freedom from fear) to the development dimension (freedom from want) of human security was that of Amartya Sen. By drawing on the concept of freedom Sen, has been able to shift the focus of security analysis and policy development from personal income and growth of gross national product to people’s capabilities to access the substantive freedoms and opportunities rooted within their social, economic and politic environment. As a result, Sen’s has called for the ‘removal of major sources of unfreedom’ such as, poverty and autocracy, lack of economic opportunities and systematic social deprivation (Sen, 200: 4). This theory is well documented by the Commission of Human Security (CHS) in the Human security now report (HSN), which broadens the scope of human security by

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embracing the obligation ‘to protect the vital core of lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ (HSN, 2003:3).

For many political theorists, such as MacFarlane and Kohng, UN’s optimistic approach to human security seems conceptually ‘overstretched’ (MacFarlane and Kohng, 2006: 231-243). The underlying assumption here is that by broadening the concept of security to include every conceivable insecurities of the individual, human security may end up hampering a proper coordination between its security policies and their practical implementation. Hence, the very idea that human security could address the totality of human vulnerabilities is indicative of a rather muddled theoretical framework.

2. The EU Approach to Human Security

A rather different trajectory to human security has been stimulated by the EU. This is predicated on, what might be called, a “a deontological” model of speaking about the threats and the responses they may require. What is at work in validating its trajectory of meaning is a Kantian deontology of moral norms, where security is offered to the most vulnerable out of a sense of duty and the closely related idea that construes human beings as ends in themselves. In as far as human security is understood within the EU system, Martin and Owen argue that by adding more conceptual depth and rigour to the concept, EU avoids the drawbacks of the UN’s model of human security (Martin and Owen, 2010: 221). From the Barcelona Report (2004) onwards, the EU’s policymakers have sought to add more definitional depth to the concept of human security and to embed it within the EU practice. To this end, the study group, led by the LSE scholar Mary Kaldor, laid down the ‘doctrine’ that enabled the EU to implement human security as a foreign policy paradigm (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Barcelona Report, 2004: 3).

The interlinking relation between threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts call into question the clear separation between internal and external threats. The theorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (New York) and 11 March 2004 (Madrid) as well as the ‘new wars’ resulting from state collapse in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus bring under pressure the clear-cut distinction between ‘human rights violation’ (by state) ‘abuses’ (by non-state actors) and conflict (between armed combatants) (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004:8; Kaldor, 2012: 27). Moreover, the global character of threats reinforces the view that insecurity is elusive and it requires a holistic security policy that focuses on the individual, instead of a state-driven approach that focuses on borders and the ‘containment’ of threats (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004).

2.1. The EU’s Human Security Doctrine

The Report lists three reasons why the EU security narrative should coordinate its policies in accordance with human security rather than a state-driven security: Morality - everyone has the right to live a secure and fulfilling life; Legality – predicated on the view that human security and human rights are part of the same spectrum; and Enlightened Self-interest- which makes the case that in a world as interconnected as ours, EU’s security cannot be met by turning a blind eye on the insecurities around the globe (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004: 9-10). In this new global context, the EU has drawn on a series of interwoven and mutually reinforcing principles, which guide its effort of implementing the concept of human security in situations of severe insecurity. In addition to the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, regional focus and the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force, the report places

significant value on the bottom-up approach to human security. For Christou, a bottom up approach to security stands in contrast with the detachment of hierarchical, top-down frameworks of dealing with security concerns. As such, a bottom up framework of addressing insecurity seeks for ‘appropriate actions to solve the security problems on the ground’ (Christou, 2014: 370). This is important, particularly as it opens the process of devising the right policy to a collaborative effort between the policy experts and the vulnerable they seek to attend (Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004: 14-19).

As for the operational framework of human security, the report encourages a holistic alleviation of insecurity and the stabilization of the situation. This has led to the creation of a Human Security Task Forces (HSTF) composed of both military and civilians (15.000 personnel). Implicit here is the belief that within a human security framework the military response is of limited value. What is required instead is a “flexible” effort between the deployment of civil and military capabilities (Solana and Kaldor, 2007). But then, again, the consultations and the increasing dialogue with the local population are essential to ensure the efficiency of the operations. The Madrid Report (entitled, A European Way of Security 2007) has continued to add depth to the conceptual framework of human security by emphasising an individual-centred approach to security (understood both, as freedom from fear and want). In essence, it seems right to suggest that EU’s focus on the doctrinal and the military-civilian response can help shape a less confusing and therefore a more practical approach to human security than the UN narrative.

And it certainly becomes clearer from examining the optimistic approach that an overstretched appropriation of human security will give rise to false priorities and hopes, to causal confusion and inappropriate solutions to security issues. In practice, it matters greatly that the policymakers have the capacity to discriminate the threats that can wait a response from those that may require immediate intervention. Also, it is important that policymakers rightfully identify the cause of an insecurity threat. Especially as this will enable the security agencies to deploy the right means for solving the threat at hand. Involving the army into a security issue which calls for a non-military response may lead to increasing threats against individuals and communities (MacFarlane and Kohng, 2006: 239). Such criticism has had the negative effect of shifting the rhetorical practices at the UN from a broad reading of human security towards a narrower conception of security, commonly associated with the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Martin and Owen, 2010: 213). The immediate benefits of a narrow reading of security are associated, among other things, with clear security priorities, which require (almost exclusively) military support against an external threat. Whilst a deontological approach to security offers a viable alternative to a state-driven security narrative, it is still not clear how a human security response should be translated into the concreteness of life. Nor is it clear how it might be seen as both a goal and a means to freedom from fear and want (Martin and Owen, 2010: 221). On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the practices of the EU remain grounded in the human security doctrine, some might worry that the narrative of human security has lost its traction in EU’s current institutional milieu (Christou, 2014: 371; Martin and Owen, 2010: 222).

3. Human Security: Towards a Critical Hermeneutical Ethics

If the EU’s discourse about human security is to address the insecurities and vulnerabilities in the concreteness of an individual life it may very well be in need of a certain supplementation. The worry here is that the interpretative component of the EU’s human security discourse is too narrowly conceived. And so, it may fail to translate into

practice policies that could help alleviate suffering and restore justice. Let me point out that there can be no proper understanding of human security in the absence of its deontological component; but in spite of this, I would like to argue nevertheless that a critical hermeneutical ethics, via the hermeneutical tradition of Ricoeur and Gadamer, supplements EU's human security discourse with a necessary layer of meaning that will make its bottom up approach more productive in its attempt to understand the vulnerable and enhance security. This argument will be developed around the three foundational components of a bottom up approach to human security: a) the identification of the threat; b) together with and for the local population; so that, c) justice is enforced. All these elements are quintessential for solving the problem on the ground. I should now look at three promising ways of supplementing the bottom up approach within the EU's human security theoretical framework.

3.1. The Linguistic Paradigm of Human Security: Getting the Threat Right

The linguistic paradigm of a critical hermeneutical ethics is primarily interested in the capacity of language to mediate between the vulnerable person and the meaning of the threat she is opposing. To begin with, it might be said that a bottom-up approach to human security provides, first, a basis for a hermeneutics of the language of evil. Before moving on to spell out in more details Ricoeur's language of evil, it is essential to point out that hidden within the mechanisms of human security is a hermeneutical struggle of 'getting right' the nature of the threat endangering various individuals. What this means is that a proper articulation of evil enables us to reconfigure and adjust our modes of engagements. Political theorists such as Michael Shapiro, places the ability to say the proper thing under the label of a 'discursive defence' and is best illustrated in Etocle's insistence that '[...] speech must be fitted to the times' (Shapiro, 2002: 223-41).¹ Again, the underlying assumption here is that our model of engagement relies on our abilities to conceptualise evil in the clearest of terms. Likewise, Susan Neiman's compelling book, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy*, establishes that what makes the discourse around evil the driving force in philosophical thought is the fact that this is a discourse about 'the intelligibility of the whole' (Neiman, 2002: 7). More importantly, Neiman opines that, beginning with the early Enlightenment, the approach to both natural and moral evil has been primarily motivated by ethical, rather than epistemological considerations. In fact, she goes on to say, that it is precisely this ethical underpinning of evil that compels us to make evil intelligible (Neiman, 2002: 8). Writing in the immediate aftermath of September 11, she rejects any "crude" or "simplistic" forms of thinking about evil - such as the ones embodied by the Bush administration. This is reflective of a shift away in politics and international relations from the liberal internationalist view of evil as "other" towards a framework in which the naming processes of evil are instrumental in helping us craft a "mechanisms of proportionality" between our means and ends of dealing with evil (Mona K. Sheikh, 2014: 492-3).²

For Ricoeur the prospect of making sense of our experience of evil must be grasped first at the level of imagery. Drawing on the anthropological myth of the Fall, he

¹ Plato, 'Euthyphro' in *Dialogues of Plato: With Analyses and Introductions*, vol. 1, trans. by J. O'wett, B. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), pp. 279-301 (p. 291, 8a), <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/13728-008>> [Accessed 25 January 2017];

² Sheikh's recourse to a performative approach to evil is shaped by the way performativity is conceptualised in the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School of security studies.

reads the primary expressions of evil (the symbol of defilement, sin and guilt) as a text analogue for a hermeneutics of being and its capability to cultivate an ethics of action against an impending threat. The continual reconfiguration of evil through an iconoclast movement of symbol (from defilement to sin and guilt), introduces evil as an elusive phenomenon. Implicit here is the possibility of blurring a clear-cut border between the external reality of evil (an evil which is already there before any choice is made) and the moral evil (evil within). What is particularly important about this language paradigm is that it stands for a much broader conception of meaning. According to Taylor, Ricoeur's symbolism of evil is reflective of an expressive-constitutive theory of language, which serves not so much to designate objects as to enhance reflection (Taylor, 2016: 4).³ It also understands language as being capable of generating new purposes and new modes of action. This theory of language departs from a designative theory of language, in which the words we speak are mere "designators", employed in order to describe the world. While the designative theory of language might be of great support in helping us identify the evil of severe insecurities (e.g. genocide or slavery), it would have little to offer in the process of naming a more elusive phenomenon of evil and the insecurities it generates. Hence, any attempt of getting right the vulnerabilities of the local population within a bottom up approach to human security must be linked to:

a) The deciphering sequence in which the language of evil is being articulated. The object of description is being "deciphered", as opposed to just being labelled. In this sense, we are confronted with a linguistic model that attempts to describe a phenomenon that is not yet within its grasp. By its very nature, the effort of giving a meaningful shape to the object of description requires linguistic "give and take". For George Steiner, such linguistic capabilities must be seen not in their ability to ascribe but to accommodate and form new meanings. Consequently, he claims that the linguistic of "give and take" defines the way we learn to inaugurate "the existence of l'autre," and our existence for him (Steiner, 1971: 64). On this account, the narrowest and most precise meaning of words has been substituted for their full range of interpretations.

b) The emotional substratum of the language of evil. Ricoeur's symbolism of evil emerges in a context in which grasping the meaning of the object coincides with the possibility of experiencing it. As a result, we are expected to understand something that we are inter-connected with. The dismissed alternative is that of a self-standing object. In our case, the point of contact between the expression of evil and language has been the field of affection. The threat that appeared first as a chaotic cluster of feelings has been shaped, by means of articulation, into a less confusing form of meaning. One is reminded here that, although chaotic, when seen from a rationalistic perspective, the realm of feelings presupposes an 'evaluative' framework (Nussbaum, 2001: 19-33). That is to say that feelings have an intentional object, which is being figured out by the interpreter in the interconnectedness between the realm of affect and that of meaning articulation.

c) The effects the deciphering of evil has on our practical engagements with evil. By the same token, the impetus for action generated by the discriminations obtained into the sphere of meaning opened up an abundant mode of recognition and involvement

³ Taylor is drawing here on Humboldt's belief that man in general articulates less of what he is aware of, or of what he would end up expressing.

with evil. In her work on the evaluative framework of emotions, Martha Nussbaum hints at the connection between the articulation of a set of beliefs and their effects on our responses to the world (Nussbaum, 2001: 29). All things considered, Nussbaum's epistemology appears to endorse a strong correlation between the nature of meaning distinction and its impact on our centring and re-centring in the world.

Drawing on Ricoeur's expressive-constitutive theory of meaning is instrumental in helping us understand the mechanisms that filter the experience of evil and the rhetorical practices of the insecure and vulnerable individuals. The problem that prevents the human security personnel from deciding which course of action to follow in order to solve the problem on the ground might have something to do with the multifarious description of evil. Accordingly, the multifarious nature of the threat ought to be clarified in conversation with a speech-partner. For this reason, it should be said that a bottom-up approach to human security provides, second, a basis for what might be called, following the tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology, a "party-dependent" model of understanding evil and its underlining insecurities (Taylor, 2002: 127).

3.2. The Dialogical Paradigm of Human Security: Understanding the Threat with a Speech-Partner

So far, we have seen that the possibility of understanding the insecure and the vulnerable is always clouded by the elusiveness of evil and the language in which it occurs. The very idea of objectivity which underlines the principle of proportionality of response to insecurities seems difficult to combine with the manifold meanings that evil might take across the cultures. It is here that Gadamer's model of understanding appears most fruitful. In his landmark study, *Truth and Method*, Gadamer shows that the most productive way of construing an event or a text is by means of a conversation, where the speech-partners come to an understanding. (Gadamer, 1989:180; Taylor, 2002: 127).⁴ Gadamer opposes the "party-dependent" understanding to the Romantic hermeneutics, whose central exponent was Schleiermacher. The aim of interpretation during that age was nothing short of infallible knowledge. Thus, knowing a text is always conclusive. So much so, that understanding 'ceases when the text is perfectly understood' (Gadamer, 1989: 293).⁵ More important is the fact that such privatisations and formalisations can generate a fixation of meaning. It is always the private path to the author's mind that would grant us access to the absolute meaning.

In contrast to classical hermeneutics, Gadamer holds the view that our access to truth must take us beyond the author's mind. This will find its central expression in the "party-dependent" hermeneutic he has developed, but before that the question of what justifies Gadamer's model of understanding must be addressed. We should do so by taking our cues from the principle of prejudice (*Vorurteil*).⁶ The prejudice or the guess is that which initiates the act of hermeneutic understanding. This means that the truthfulness of

⁴ In contrast to Taylor, who deals with Gadamer in the context of the human sciences, our interaction with his thought is primarily placed within the realm of textual hermeneutics.

⁵ Gadamer suggests that by conceiving hermeneutics in a 'way that is *formally* universal' the Romantic hermeneutists "were able to harmonize it with the natural sciences" ideal of objectivity'; See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 293.

⁶ In his earlier work Hirsch has been very critical of Gadamer's hermeneutics and its move beyond the authorial intentionality. Though, he speaks in positive terms about the doctrine of the prejudice, whose importance he thinks, extends to all forms of textual interpretation; See: pp. 258-265.

our guesses can only be grasped in light of the succeeding stages of understanding. Now, one might like to question Gadamer's reliance on prejudice by arguing that given the endless number of guesses at our disposal, it seems unlikely that we would manage to choose the right ones. So, as long as choosing the right prejudices benefits the right interpretation, this seems like a serious objection to hermeneutical understanding. Seen from a different perspective the main worry here is that Gadamer's model of understanding might be sliding into relativism.

However, it seems very unlike that Gadamer can be placed in this position. For one, the structure of conversational understanding itself, allows us to see whether our prejudices are enabling or blinding our understanding of the issue at hand (Bernstein, 1989: 128). In this sense, the fact that all human knowledge is permeated with prejudices does not mean that one cannot discriminate between the more enabling and the blinding prejudices. More to the point, Hirsch has persuasively shown that one's chances of making a correct preliminary guess increases when the limitations imposed on meaning through cultural norms and conventions are considered (Hirsch, 1967: 262). For instance, Hirsch goes on to say that, given the conventions in place, two persons can ascribe an identical meaning to a single linguistic sign, sentences and genre. An important place in his evaluation is afforded to genre, which given its vast usage had acquired a "partly fixed nature". More importantly, Hirsch thinks that, since there is no radical new genre, every spoken utterance must fit within boundaries of genre so conceived. But this is a rather different perspective on the likelihood of being able to make the right guesses from the one advanced by its sceptical counterpart.

This, I suggest, leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that the issue in dealing with the principle of prejudice at this stage is not one of making the right guesses but one of having an incomplete knowledge of its meaning. What is needed then is a dialogical space where one hopes to detect and eliminate error by allowing our prejudices to be criticized and corrected and by criticizing and correcting the prejudices of our speech-partners. This is where the "party-dependent" understanding comes to the surface: first, as a language that has been corrected and tested by the whole spectrum of relevant data, and second, as the willingness to understand the other within her tradition, language and culture (Taylor, 2002: 133). The corollary of a party-dependent understanding, according to Gadamer is a "fusion of horizons", which suggest that the speech partners have expanded their understanding to the point where they can name, in a language that both parties understand, that which was previously the unfamiliar other. For Ricoeur this fusion of horizons is well reflected into his concept of "linguistic hospitality", which is primarily seen as 'the act of inhabiting the word of the other paralleled by the act of receiving the word of the other into one's home, one's dwelling' (Ricoeur, 2006: xvi; Kearney, 2007: 151).⁷ In sum, my point in using Gadamer's account of the other and the "fusion of horizons" is also relevant to our attempts to understand the insecure and the vulnerable, however alien they might be. What Gadamer's theory of interpretation has thought us is that the process of understanding their insecurities is difficult to achieve and will certainly involve a change in the horizon of our responses. Also, it is worth reminding ourselves that both Ricoeur and Gadamer's attempt of figuring out the experience of evil and its underlying violence against humans is pursued within a larger concern for an ethics of action. For Ricoeur the rich meaning of symbol should not be dispelled, but translated into

⁷ Linguistic hospitality as such, means that we can never achieve a perfect translation; there is always something that resists translation and so, we are continually seeking to find the right word for it.

a coherent discourse about our responsibility to recognize and oppose evil. Likewise, the rationale underlying the EU's attempt to adjust its security policies to fit a bottom up approach to human security is bound up with certain moral commitments to properly name and transform the unjust structures of the world. This, we have seen, may occur within the space created by a "fusion of horizons" between the human security representative and the vulnerable individual. What I want therefore to move on to do in this concluding section is to offer some of Ricoeur's remarks about the realm of ethics and justice. This will give us a better appreciation of the concept of justice as understood through Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" (Ricoeur's 'inter-linguistic hospitality').

3.3. The Ethical Paradigm of Human Security: Towards a Teleological Appreciation of Justice

In a significant study entitled *The Self and the Ethical Aim*, Ricoeur develops a novel theory of ethics, starting from a definition that reads ethics as 'the aim of the good life, with and for others, in just institutions' (Ricoeur, 1992: 172). We should look at each component of this definition in turn.

a) The "Good" Life

First, the object of an ethical life is the "good life." Ricoeur understands this through the Aristotelian concept of the good, which is always a "good for us". As a result, Ricoeur's entire ethical project is based on a concept of good that is oriented in praxis (Ricoeur, 1992: 172). More importantly, the aim of the "good" life is never fully attained. The best we can do is to continually strive to achieve it. In the end, it is this teleological quest for the good life and its implicit instances of good moral actions that enables moral thinking. In this sense, Ricoeur teaches us that the full shape of a good life is always mediated by main narratives and "life plans" which incorporate the totality of our moral practices. It is at this juncture that hermeneutics becomes particularly relevant for a coherent ethics of action. More precisely, Ricoeur's critical hermeneutical ethics invites for the translation of the sometimes discordant goods into a plot that gives life its narrative unity. In addition, narratives offer a context in which new moral and social practices can be imagined and acted upon. Ricoeur's favourite model of figuring out the meaning and the practical implications of these potentially new moral practices is that of practical wisdom (phronesis). To see the hermeneutical circle underlying Ricoeur's ethical project we could think of a text in which the whole explains the part of the text and vice versa. It is precisely "back-and-forth" motion between the most important decisions in life and the idea of a "good life" or the text as a whole and its parts that shape our ethics of action (Ricoeur, 1992: 179).

b) The "Good" Life with and for Others

Second, aiming at the "good life" is always "with and for others." This second component of Ricoeur's ethical project is already implicated in the first. For the person who strives for the "good life" cannot strive in isolation from other people and their moral interests (Nussbaum, 2002: 272). For Ricoeur the trajectory of an ethical plan in which one wishes for the "good" life "with and for others" is best reflected in the term solicitude. Under the influence of Aristotle, Ricoeur reads solicitude in the context of friendship and its focus on the mutuality of giving and receiving that occurs between friends. Hence, to embark on a quest for the "good" life under the guidance of solicitude is to think of intersubjectivity as being more fundamental than one's obedience to duty and one's

obligation to take responsibility for the insecurities of the other. (Ricoeur, 1992:180). To avoid confusion Ricoeur demarcates his account of solicitude from Levinas's concept of interpersonal communication. For Ricoeur, Levinas's initiative towards the other establishes 'irrelation' instead of a genuine interpersonal relationship. This is mainly because the other is grasped only as absolute exteriority. And so, the face of the other "does not appear; it is not a phenomenon; it is an epiphany" (Ricoeur, 1992: 188-89). What this really means is that Levinas's development of interpersonal communication can occur only under the condition of norms and obligations towards the other. In contrast, solicitude unfolds as "benevolent spontaneity" towards the other, and it is centred on the midpoint of a spectrum between giving and receiving (Ricoeur, 1992: 188).

It is crucial to recognize here that solicitude manifests itself in a dialogical relation with self-esteem. It therefore prevents us from thinking of it as a virtue added unto self-esteem from exterior. More importantly, Ricoeur links up self-esteem to "capacity", understood as the ability of an individual to think of herself to be good. But then, to move from capacity to realization one needs the mediation role of the other. This mediating role is essential to understand Ricoeur's departure from the philosophies of natural law that 'presuppose a subject, complete and already fully endowed with rights before entering into society' (Ricoeur:1992, 181). The flaw with these philosophies, Ricoeur concludes, lies in the assumption that the individual appears as a subject of law, before any social bond is constituted and so, they fail 'to recognize the mediating role of others between capacities and realization' (Ricoeur:1992, 181). This mediated capacity is significant for Ricoeur's ethical project and it remains closely interlinked with the development of a just society.

c) Just Institutions

Finally, the quest for the good life is always oriented towards "just institutions". In this sense, Ricoeur extends the ethical plane from the personal and the interpersonal to that of the public domain, which involves the idea of legal constraints. By institutions, Ricoeur understands 'the structure of living together as this belongs to a historical community [...] a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with these' (Ricoeur:1992, 194). One major implication of this is that the subjects of ethics are both individual and collective. In which case, the good of individuals necessitates an 'action that is common to both the collective and individuals' (Deneulin, 2006: 38). Since the action within these structures of living together contains the possibility of violence, produced either by (agents over agents, or by institutions over institutions) some ways to limit or to legitimate just coercion need to be found. It is here that Ricoeur understands the Kantian principle of universality and the idea of seeing man as an end in itself to be particularly efficient in limiting and legitimizing the use of force. It also builds the epistemological framework in which the agent can use the idea of obligation in its pursuit of morality, instead of using the idea of the good (Nussbaum, 2002: 271).

Let me draw together the ways in which Ricoeur's critical hermeneutical ethics may appear to supplement a bottom up approach human security discourse. Having defined Ricoeur's ethical project in terms of the individual's wish to live a good life with others in just institutions, I have briefly indicated that justice enters the ethical plane as a component of a teleological desire for the "good" life. In this sense, the ethical search for justice is more fundamental than the deontological responsibility for transforming the unjust structures of individuals (Deneulin, 2006: 35). By positing the search for justice within the ethical search for the good life, Ricoeur supplements the security policies adopted to protect the valuable capabilities of the individual with an overall framework of

good, that falls beyond human's power to choose a certain course of action or not. Moreover, since much in the process of finding the right security policy rests on an understanding of the individual as development, Ricoeur's critical hermeneutic ethics appears to supplement the EU human security discourse with a recognition of collective subjects. Hence, one's quest for good is always mediated by the "structures of living together" formed in tradition and community. These structures may shape the process of decision making to listen more carefully to the socio-historical narratives of the individuals when devising security measures.

Concluding remarks

I have put forward an account of the "bottom up" approach to human security which is rather differently focused from the EU's doctrine. Specifically, we have been considering how the discourse around human security may involve not so much a direct grasp of a deontological theory of moral rules, or some juridical institutions, as the recognition of a hermeneutical-phenomenological ethics of action. I have suggested three levels of analysis of a hermeneutical-phenomenological ethics, based on the opportunities that are afforded by a bottom up approach to human security and its focus on the linguistic paradigm of the threat, the dialogical paradigm and the concern for justice. I have then moved on to investigate these three cornerstones of human security from the perspective of a hermeneutical-phenomenological model of understanding. I have emphasised that a proper articulation of evil is instrumental in helping clarify our modes of engagement. I have then pointed out that in order to have a clear grasp of the insecurities and the threats of the individual we will need a language paradigm that is able to accommodate and form new horizons of meaning rather than just labelling the threats at hand. I have also proposed that a "party-dependent" model of understanding can help expand our understanding of the unfamiliar other and her insecurities. In addition, I have hinted at the idea that a "party-dependent" epistemology and its rejection of relativism and ready-made presuppositions is crucial to ensure a just reaction to the security threats. Lastly, I have explored Ricoeur's teleological approach to justice and its fundamental concern for the good of the individual rather than the protection of their rights. Problematising the issue of security along the lines of a critical hermeneutical ethics has given us access to an anthropological, pre-judicial foundation in which our quest for a more secure world is mediated by tradition and community, is open to the multitude of ways that the unfamiliar other and the elusiveness of insecurity may take, and is oriented in practice. This account, I have argued will not be of merely hermeneutical and phenomenological interests. It is meant first of all to supplement the deontological level of the quest for justice and human development with a teleological quest for justice, as a wish for the "good" life. In this way justice and security cannot be envisaged in purely institutional terms. Hence, if this supplementation of an institutionalised view of human security with a more basic form of grasping our quest for the "good" is plausible, it implies that any viable human security policy must not only be holistic and open to the unfamiliar other, it must also acknowledge that its scope and its underlying ontology will be most productively expressed by means of a "double-voiced" discourse (deontological and teleological). This supports the idea that the policies are destined to have a content, which is always about the distribution of good things to vulnerable and insecure individuals.

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